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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly hold that Far West Capital ("FWC")

had a right to reject a financing arrangement offered by The Geothermal Company
("TGC") where the parties' written agreement provided that (a) funding of a loan was a
condition precedent of a transaction, (b) the agreement was not binding until the loan was
provided, and (c) FWC had a right to reject the loan if its terms, or the terms of the
associated transaction were unsatisfactory to FWC, and where TGC tendered
performance that did not include the loan and the terms of the entire transaction were not
acceptable to FWC?
2.

Did the district court correctly hold that the Statute of Frauds

precluded any alleged oral modification of the parties written agreement, where the oral
agreement would have waived an express condition precedent defined as "material" by
the parties, where the doctrine of part performance does not apply because TGC was not
seeking specific performance?
3.

Did the district court correctly hold that no cause of action for

quantum meruit existed where an express contract existed, where that contract was
terminated according to its terms, and where the contract called for each party to bear its
own expenses in the event the contract was terminated?

2

Standard of Review:
This Court reviews the district court's ruling for error. Interwest Constr.
Co. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-89 (Utah 1996). However, the district court may be
affirmed on any basis that appears in the record. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1259
(Utah 1998).
In reviewing a ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations of the
complaint are taken as true and liberally construed, and the plaintiff is entitled to the
benefit of any inferences which can reasonably be drawn from those allegations. Olson v.
Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991). TGC suggests that, in
reading the Complaint, this Court may consider "unpled facts." (Aplt. Br. at 13) That is
true, but only in a limited way. It is clear that the "unpled facts" which may be
considered are only those which may be reasonably inferred from the facts that are pled.
See, e.g., Olson, 815 P.2d at 1360 (motion to dismiss granted when "under no set of facts
proven in support of the claim as pleaded would a party be entitled to relief (emphasis
added)). The Court is not required to conjure up unpled facts out of thin air. Nor is the
Court required to infer unpled facts which are inconsistent with the facts which have been
alleged, including facts which appear on the face of documents which TGC has
incorporated into its Complaint.

3

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1

Estate

,

11 ill 1 llian leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relatwi^ •• creio. shall be created, granted,
assigned surrendered or HcrhrH -thcnviNC than by act or operation ui ui^ w; ,
conveyance

.u. ^ t. ,u *. : . t ^ i t . . t
• *•'* u ^r: thereunto auihorized K

i

U^MH

Utah Code Ann, § 25-5-8
(Doctrine ol rail l J cilouriaiicc)
Ri gli il il mi < i||iiii c mi I in in il in i in I in in il il il il il il il i in il in HI I -ill I'll'ir I il ill
contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts ~

L^-*

performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof. •
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r
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This breach of contract action was dismissed on a motion under Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The documents allegedly reflecting the contract were attached and
incorporated into the Complaint. (R. 16:1-205) The district court reviewed the relevant
documents and the allegations of the Complaint and held that no breach of the signed,
written agreement had occurred. Rather, the contract was terminated according to its
terms. Any alleged oral modification of the written agreement was barred by the Statute
of Frauds.
The Dealings of The Parties
In 1994, Far West Capital ("FWC") - owner of a new, valuable, but
temporarily cash-strapped geothermal energy plant - was approached by The Geothermal
Company ("TGC"). TGC brought no cash of its own to the table (R.16:60-63), but
claimed to have expertise in raising money from outside investors. TGC offered to raise
capital in exchange for half ownership.
A Letter of Intent ("LoI") was signed on August 10, 1994, to allow TGC to
begin a search for investors. (R. 16:16-24)
The LoI provided that, if TGC arranged a $1 million loan (the "Loan") by a
date certain, and if TGC completed a "roll-up" acquisition of two related entities ("1-A"
and the "Fund") within one year of closing the Loan, then FWC and TGC would execute
a "mutually acceptable" - but still unnegotiated - option agreement. TGC would receive
5

t i>ik'.ir;n .itiiioi '

fi - § i" 11 - ri I1 p e r m i t interest in the plant (referred to in the Lol as

i.J III") for approximately $4 million, and would receive rights related to future
financing.

•.
•

The Lol bristles s* ith express provision, n/lU'IMIII^J HV< ' ^ 'in I

about M i( \abilii , n I.HM \ ii-h ,il .ill

i%

l 'vrt.nn 1 v

l< I iilom mi favorable t e r m s - a n d F W C ' s

i"n>fisciL|ijeiii ruv<f iin the ability lo term
w

transaction if the terms ultimately

pAwwA.wd were unfavorable. For one thing, the timely funding of the Loan on specified
Icrnis was made a linchpin, and an express condition precedciil HI llm \ nhii h a n ^ u d >
1 he Lol contains the lollowiuy icnns n iili rinplmsis .iil'ilnl:
I (rt. will acquire an option from F W C to obtain the interests and
rights described above for arranging a O n e Million Dollar
($1,000,000) loan to F W C
(Executive Summary 1 A , R. 16
,
T Jut her F W C nor T G C shall have any obligation to proceed v
i I "ciiient, nor any transaction described herein, until T G C
provides proof, satisfactory to F W C , that T G C is r e a d y , willing
and able to proceed with the L o a n on the terms and conditions
described in paragraph 1 below, which must occur on or before
December 1, 1994. (Executive Summary % C, R. 10.18;
J>

W h e n T G C establishes its ability to proceed with the L o a n
pursuant so the preceding paragraph C, both F W C and T G C shan
complete the following documentation to be placed in escrow as a
?
ni of closing the Loan; an executed mutually acceptable
o, -1" ^;-v*rvs
(Executive Summary f D, R, 16:18)

•

The completion of the preceding documeniatu-;
commenced as soon as p o s s i b l e , .
.. v ertheless 1- \\ < shall not be
required to actually deposit any d o c u m e n t into escrow until T G C

tenders performance of its Loan obligations as set out in this
Agreement. (Executive Summary, R. 16:18)
•

All obligations of FWC shall be contingent upon TGC providing
the Loan on the following terms: [describing $1,000,000 principal
balance, payable to FWC not later than December 1, 1994, with
specified interest and payment terms, and specifying security
offered]. (Material Terms 1(1 (i) - (v), R.16:18-19)

•

In the event that TGC fails to close the Loan on or before
December 1, 1994, this Agreement shall be null and void and the
parties shall each bear their own costs (including accountant's,
consultant's and attorney's fees) incurred with respect to this
Agreement, without any liability or further obligation to each other.
(Material Terms T| l(vii), R.16:19)

•

In partial consideration for TGC's funding of the Loan, and
contingent upon the prior funding of the Loan in accordance with
paragraph 1 above and successful approval of the roll-up of the Fund
in accordance with paragraph 3 below, and only after TGC meets
these conditions precedent, FWC shall sublease the geothermal
mineral rights, and convey all of the power plants and the related
assets . . . and liabilities of 1-A and the Fund to TGC's designated
limited liability company . . . . (Material Terms ^| 2, R.16:19)

•

In further consideration for TGC's funding of the Loan, and
contingent upon the prior funding of the Loan in accordance with
paragraph 1 above, FWC will grant TGC the Option to acquire the
fifty-percent interest in SB II & III for approximately ($4,000,000),
. . . expiring one (1) year from the closing date of the Loan
(Material Terms H 4, R. 16:20)

In addition, any limitation on FWC's ability to transfer assets or incur
liabilities existed only "[a]s long as the Loan [was] outstanding." (Material Terms ^fl[ 2,
8,R.16:19,22)
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In October 1994, TGC sought and received a written, signed one-month
extension to fund the Loan. Other terms of the Lol remained unmodified. (R. 16:26-27)
By February 3, 1995, the Loan remained unfunded and FWC had received
no capital from TGC.
TGC sought and received a second written, signed modification to the Lol,
which, inter alia, reduced the Loan amount from $1,000,000 to $300,000, but increased
the capital contribution to $5,000,000. (R. 16:29-30). The February 3, 1995 Modification
also waived the separate deadline for funding the Loan, but required the entire transaction
to be completed by M y 31, 1995. (R.16:32)
The February 3, 1995, Modification reiterated that the acquisition by TGC
of the option it sought was "contingent on TGCo providing the three hundred
thousand dollars ($300,000) loan." (R.16:29 (emphasis added))
The February 3, 1995 Modification also added new elements requiring
FWC's agreement before the transaction could be completed. For example, a new
provision required that FWC's right to receive project income be subordinated to
whomever TGC recruited to provide the financing. This subordination could take place,
however, only if "the terms of the project financing [were] otherwise acceptable to . . .
FWC."1 (February 3, 1995, Modification 1J5, R.16:30-31).
1

The February 3, 1995, Modification also added a provision making TGC, or
a designee acceptable to FWC, the operator of the project. However, that provision also
required the negotiation of an operating agreement acceptable to FWC.
8

Most important to this action, the February 3, 1995 Modification contained
the following provision at Paragraph 7 (R. 16:31):
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein or in the Letter
of Intent dated August 10, 1994, and its first modification dated
October 26, 1994, any and all commitments, responsibilities and/or
obligations which have been set forth either in writing or verbally are not
binding upon either party . . . until such time as TGCo delivers to FWC
and FWC receives the proceeds of the three hundred thousand dollars
($300,000) loan as contemplated by the Lol and this Revision. Further,
FWC and TGCo mutually agree that FWC has sole right not to accept the
three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) loan from TGCo if the terms
and conditions thereof, as they are more fully described in loan documents
yet to be created, are not acceptable for any reason whatsoever or if the
business terms and conditions associated with the loan are unfavorable
in the sole opinion of FWC. Further, the Lol and this Revision comprise
the total good faith negotiations, representations, and responsibilities and
obligations to date which may exist between FWC and TGCo and the
conditions under which FWC may agree to accept, extend or modify the
same are subject to the approval of the FWC Board of Directors and shall
only become binding upon FWC with that approval. (Emphasis added.)
On May 25, 1995 - without prior agreement on any further modifications to
the Lol - TGC's legal counsel presented FWC with the Private Placement Memorandum.
(Complaint at If 15, R. 16:6-7) Among other things, the Private Placement Memorandum
made no provision for the $300,000 Loan. It also provided for a capital contribution of
$4,000,000, rather than $5,000,000. (R.16:155) In addition, the Private Placement
Memorandum called for subordination of FWC's cash flows to the investor (R. 16:66-70,

(February 3, 1995, Modification ^ 2, R.16:30)
9

75), thus triggering the provision in Paragraph 2 of the February 3, 1995 Modification
expressly requiring FWC's consent to the entire financing transaction. (R.16:30-31)
The parties held discussions after May 25, 19952 (Complaint at <|flf 16-21,
R. 16:7-8), but FWC ultimately rejected the terms proposed in the Private Placement
Memorandum, or in any subsequent negotiations, and terminated the relationship.
(Complaint at ^ 22, R. 16:8-9)
TGC alleges that FWC and its directors orally agreed to terms contained in
the Private Placement Memorandum (Complaint at Tf 16, R.16:7), and that allegation must
be accepted as true for the moment. Significantly, TGC does not allege that FWC or its
directors agreed to terms proposed in meetings after May 25, 1995, but only that TGC's
own people "left the meeting with the impression that all issues were satisfactorily
resolved." (Complaint at ^f 21, R.16:8) Regardless, FWC never signed any document

2

At one point - and one point, only - the Complaint references
"March 25, 1995," instead of "May 25, 1995." (Complaint at^[ 16, R.16:7) This can only
be a typographical error. The date, March 25, 1995, has no significance in the dealings of
the parties. Furthermore, the remaining allegations and arguments of TGC in the trial
court reference discussions occurring only after TGC's lawyers presented the Private
Placement Memorandum to FWC. (Complaint atfflf17-20, R.16:7-8)
The conclusion that the single reference to March 25 is an error is consistent with
the recollection of the FWC, as well. FWC recalls that, after the signing of the
February 3, 1995 Modification, they were presented, on or about May 25, 1995, with the
Private Placement Memorandum as a fait accompli. All discussions regarding the terms
of the Private Placement Memorandum took place after that date.
10

reflecting the alleged modifications set forth in the Private Placement Memorandum or
any subsequent discussions.
This Action
For four full years after negotiations fell apart, the principals of TGC did
nothing. In fact, they allowed TGC to lapse as a corporation. (R.23-24, 33)
Then, in 1999, when FWC had found an investor to buy the geothermal
plant on favorable terms, TGC filed this lawsuit, causing the sale to fail.3 (R.215:14-15)
The Complaint alleges that the Lol, its two signed modifications, and the
unsigned Private Placement Memorandum contain the "contract" of the parties.
(Complaint at ^ 16-18, 25, R.16:7) However, the Complaint also inconsistently alleges
that some terms of the parties' contract were orally agreed after the Private Placement
Memorandum was issued. (Complaint at ^f 21, R. 16:8)
In particular, the Complaint alleges that six weeks after the Private
Placement Memorandum was presented to FWC - and after FWC raised a new concern
that it would be saddled with expenses related to the transaction - the parties agreed that,
"as a further accommodation," TGC would "reimburse any reasonable closing costs, up to

3

After the district court dismissed this action - and after the time for this
appeal had run - FWC filed a malicious prosecution action against TGC, which is
currently pending in Nevada state court. The filing of the Nevada action apparently
prompted TGC to seek, and obtain, an extension of time to file this appeal.
11

$300,000, out of [TGC's] financing proceeds" and "provide a letter of credit to this
effect." (Complaint at t21d,R.16:8)
There is no indication in the Complaint that this after-the-fact "further
accommodation" was intended as a substitute for the $300,000 Loan, which was an
express condition precedent of the entire transaction. Yet, TGC shifted gears and made
exactly that argument when FWC pointed out below that the Loan, which was the
linchpin of the transaction, was omitted from the performance outlined by the Private
Placement Memorandum and allegedly "tendered" by TGC. (R.215:17, 215:20-23)
TGC continues arguing on appeal that the parties agreed that a $300,000 payment from
the financing proceeds was a substitute for the Loan, even though this was never pled,
and is, indeed, inconsistent with the Complaint. Cf Complaint at ^f 2Id (R. 16:8)
In sum, TGC's own Complaint is internally inconsistent as to the terms of
the alleged contract, and its arguments below and here contradict the Complaint and
introduce yet another element of uncertainty into the terms - yet TGC alleged in its
Complaint that all material terms were "described with sufficient specificity" to allow a
suit for their alleged breach.
One thing is certain: TGC never alleged satisfaction of the express
conditions precedent contained in the Lol. Rather, TGC alleged only that it tendered
performance under the terms of the unsigned Private Placement Memorandum, which
omitted the express conditions precedent. See Complaint at % 16 ("Plaintiffs . . . did
12

tender performance, of all acts as specified in Exhibit D [the Private Placement
Memorandum]") (R. 16:7)
Whatever written and/or oral terms TGC now believes comprised the
contract, TGC brought claims for its breach, as well as quasi-contract, quantum meruit
and fraud claims. The Complaint sought only damages.4 TGC did not seek - nor plead
the prerequisites for - specific performance.
FWC moved to dismissed all claims. The district court granted the motion.
The district court held that the Complaint, read together with the
incorporated documents, showed that the Statute of Frauds prohibited oral alteration of
the Lol, and that, under the terms of the Lol, FWC had an express right to terminate.
(R.215:28-29)
The district court dismissed the quasi-contract/quantum meruit claim
because such claims are barred when an express contract exists and that contract was
simply terminated according to its terms. (R.141) The fraud claim was dismissed
because even TGC admitted it was insufficient. (R.141)
TGC never sought leave to amend its Complaint.

4

Inexplicably, TGC seeks more than $21,000,000 in damages, including
sums it would have passed through to its alleged investor. (Complaint at ^f 34, R. 16:11)
The investor is not a party to this action. TGC offers no explanation as to how payments
it would have made on a loan, had the transaction been completed, can constitute
"profits" to itself.
13

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The written agreement alleged by TGC contains numerous provisions
making the provision of a loan on specified terms a condition precedent of any obligation
under that agreement. It also contains provisions giving FWC the opportunity to
negotiate the terms of the ultimate financing transaction. When the loan was not timely
funded, the agreement lapsed and was partially revived. In the revived agreement, the
loan was still a condition precedent. Furthermore, FWC was given express rights to walk
away from the transaction if terms of the loan, or if any of the business terms associated
with the loan, were unsatisfactory to FWC for any reason. FWC properly exercised those
rights when TGC tendered performance which did not include the loan, and which
contained other terms which were not satisfactory to FWC.
The Statute of Frauds bars any attempt by TGC to modify the foregoing
material terms of the written agreement. Thus, TGC cannot claim that the contract was
orally modified to waive the condition precedent and bypass FWC's rights to be satisfied
with the ultimate transaction. The doctrine of part performance does not apply, because
this is not a case seeking specific performance.
The Court should not apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to rewrite the agreement, thereby giving TGC a unilateral right to substitute a
cash payment for the loan, thereby further cutting off FWC s right to negotiate and be
satisfied with the ultimate terms of the financing transaction.
14

Where the relationship of the parties was terminated according to the terms
of their written agreement, and where the agreement provided that each should bear their
own expenses, there can be no claim for quantum meruit.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AGREEMENT EVIDENCED BY THE LETTER OF INTENT
WAS TERMINATED PURSUANT TO ITS TERMS.
A.

TGC Ignores Numerous Provisions Making The Loan Central
To The Entire Transaction.

As set forth in the Statement of the Case, the provision of the Loan on terms
completely acceptable to FWC was a linchpin of the entire transaction contemplated by
the Lol. The Loan was a "linchpin" because the Lol expressly and unambiguously
provided that, without the Loan, the entire transaction came apart.
On this appeal, as it did below, TGC ignores the numerous unambiguous
provisions of the Lol demonstrating the absolute centrality of the Loan and completely
excusing FWC from performance if the Loan did not meet precise specifications. FWC's
right to walk away from the transaction was spelled out in even stronger language when
the Lol was modified in 1995, after all deadlines for funding the Loan had passed, no
money had changed hands, the plant had survived without the quick infusion of cash
originally promised by TGC and was developing an operating history that showed it to be
less risky, more profitable and, hence, more valuable than it was thought to be when the
original Lol was negotiated. (Complaint at ^f 22, R. 16:8-9)
15

In the original Lol, dated August 10, 1994, the Loan was expressly
designated as the consideration for the options sought by TGC. (Executive Summary
1f A, R.16:17; Material Termsfflf2, 4, R. 16:19-20) All obligations of FWC were
expressly made contingent upon the timely funding of the Loan, with each party bearing
its own expenses if the Loan was not timely funded. (Executive Summaryffi[C, D,
R.16.18, Material Terms 1fl[ 1, 2, 4, R.16:18-19, 20) The closing of the Loan was
expressly made a "condition precedent" of the entire transaction. (Material Terms Tf 2,
R.16:19) The parties also contemplated negotiation of an option agreement, which would
have given FWC the opportunity to ensure that the terms of the ultimate financing
arrangement offered them a fair return for the valuable asset they were being asked to
convey. (Executive Summary ^f D, R. 16:18)
B.

The Final Written Modification Strengthened FWCs Express
Right To Reject Both The Loan, And The Entire Transaction,

The last written modification of the Lol was made on February 3, 1995,
after the extended deadline for funding the Loan had passed, and the Lol had, by its own
terms, become "null and void." (Material Terms Tf l(viii), R.16:19) This final written
modification partially revived the relationship, but it was even more tentative than in the
original Lol.
The February 3, 1995 Modification reaffirmed that the entire transaction
was contingent upon funding of the Loan, albeit in a reduced amount of $300,000.

16

(R.16:29) The February 3, 1995 Modification also expressly required FWC's acceptance
of "the terms of the project financing," if FWC's rights to cash flow were subordinated to
the rights of the investor recruited by TGC. February 3, 1995, Modification ^f 5,
R.16:30-31)
In addition, Paragraph 7 of the February 3, 1995, Modification (R. 16:31)
contains the following, critical provisions.
First, while the original Lol contained language suggesting that the parties
had agreed to be immediately bound (Material Terms If 13, R.16:23), Paragraph 7 of the
February 3, 1995 Modification states that, "[notwithstanding anything to the contrary"
contained in the Lol or its written modifications, all obligations were expressly made "not
binding" until the Loan was both delivered by TGC and received by FWC.
Second, Paragraph 7 expressly gave FWC the "sole right not to accept" the
Loan if the Loan's "terms and conditions" were "not acceptable for any reason
whatsoever."
Third, Paragraph 7 expressly gave FWC the right to look beyond the "terms
and conditions" of the Loan, itself, and to reject the Loan "if the business terms and
conditions associated with the loan [were] unfavorable in the sole opinion of FWC."

17

Fourth, Paragraph 7 required approval of the board of directors of FWC to
modify any of the terms of the Lol.5
None of the foregoing terms is ambiguous, particularly if the entire Lol and
its modifications are read as a whole, as they must be. See, e.g., Dixon v. Pro Image Inc.,
987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999).
C.

The Performance Allegedly Tendered By TGC Did Not Conform
To The Terms Of The Letter Of Intent

According to TGC's Complaint, on May 25, 1995, TGC's counsel
presented FWC with the Private Offering Memorandum, containing the terms of the
transaction which TGC wished to close. On its face, the Private Offering Memorandum
contains no provision for the $300,000 Loan even though, under the plain terms of
Paragraph 7, FWC was not bound at all until that Loan was received by FWC.
Furthermore, the Private Offering Memorandum requires FWC to
subordinate its rights to cash flows to TGC's investor, thus triggering the express
requirement that the entire financing transaction receive FWC's approval. The Private
Offering Memorandum further differs from the February 3, 1995 Modification in that it

5

In one of several "straw men" in its brief on appeal, TGC goes to great
pains to state that Paragraph 7 does not expressly require modifications to be in writing.
(Aplt. Br. at 9) The district court never said that the "writing" requirement originated
solely in Paragraph 7, but, rather, under Paragraph 7 and the Statute of Frauds. (R.124)
Furthermore, even if the district court misspoke as to the effect of Paragraph 7 on this
point, it is clear that he was correct about the applicability of the Statute of Frauds, as
discussed, infra, in the text.
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contemplates a cash contribution of $4,000,000, rather than $5,000,000, and does not
include the additional equity interests which TGC was attempting to purchase from
FWC's original lender, and which were to be contributed by TGC to the joint venture.
TGC argues that it was not required to satisfy an express condition
precedent by funding the Loan, because the Loan was somehow subsumed within cash
amounts being offered by the Private Offering Memorandum or in subsequent
negotiations. Even if that were so, FWC had a right to reject the deal if the Loan, itself,
was satisfactory, but if FWC found the "business terms and conditions associated with the
loan" to be unfavorable, in its "sole opinion."
TGC also argues that FWC orally waived the Loan requirement, accepting a
$300,000 contribution from the financing proceeds in its place. However, TGC's
Complaint never alleges that the $300,000 was intended by the parties, or accepted by
FWC's directors, as a substitute for the Loan. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges that
this amount was allegedly offered as a "further accommodation" some weeks after TGC
"tendered" performance under the terms of the Private Placement Memorandum. Thus,
TGC's main argument on appeal is based on an allegation never made in the Complaint,
and which, indeed contradicts the allegations which were made.
Even if the Complaint had made the necessary allegations, however, it is
plain from the Complaint and its incorporated documents that the alleged "tender" made
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Memorandum, but not to the only signed

writings between the parties, ui<* Lol and its modifications.
Because the tender did not conform to the terms of the Lol, TGC has
absolutely no claim on the alleged contract. Under the express terms ul (in I ol, I VV"! ' w „i „
«'

i

i eceh red In addition, FWC had express rights to walk aw ay from the transaction if the
Loan, or the conditions associated with it, were iinsalisfactory.
TGC's argument thus boils down to ii ^ ;,iijm.u a^crtum ...... • A K s
directors orall) w ai\ ed the I oan, an expi ess cor:
FWC" , \ 'in dully r, nisti i icted i ights to reject the liiianum* arrangement if FWC did not
agree to its terms, and orally agreed to bind FWC to transfer half its valuable asset on
terms that, with the passage of time, had become less attractive.
The district court, however,, would not Inn i, IXTM icquiied In i lalil
allege.

•*
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from the Complaint and its incorporated documents that the Statute of Frauds bars oral
modifications of the Lol.

6

FWC would also have to have orally waived another express condition
precedent, the roll-up acquisition of its related entities, and to have orally agreed to a cash
contribution of $4,000,000, instead of the $^000 ono —templated by the
February 3, 1995 modification
20

II.

THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS BARS ORAL MODIFICATION OF
THE LETTER OF INTENT.
TGC has wisely abandoned its argument below that the Statute of Frauds

does not apply to the Lol, which contemplated the ultimate transfer of leaseholds and
interests in "real property, well field, easements of ingress/egress, geothermal resources,
and associated rights." (Executive Summary, R.16:16) The Statute of Frauds clearly
applies to the transaction, as TGC now concedes.
As TGC also concedes, the Statute of Frauds would generally require a
writing, signed by FWC, to modify the terms of the Lol. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1; Allen
v. Kingdom 723 P.2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986); Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575, 579
(Utah App. 1993). TGC argues, however, that the Statute of Frauds does not bar oral
modification of the Lol because the allegedly altered terms, including the requirement of
the Loan, were immaterial, and because the doctrine of part performance took the
transaction out of the Statute. Both assertions are incorrect.
A.

The Loan And Other Provisions Protecting FWC's Ultimate
Right To Approve All The Terms Of The Financing
Arrangement Were Obviously Material.

It cannot seriously be argued that the Loan was immaterial to the
transaction. The parties, themselves, defined the Loan as "material" in the Lol and its
modifications. Almost every "Material Term" agreed by the parties in the original Lol
mentions the Loan and its central position in the transaction. The first written
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; entirely w ith extending the deadline for funding the Loan.
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second written inwxxAwdtion affirms the materiality of the Loan by, iniei alia, providing
that no one was bound tv the To!, at all, until the Loan was received by FWC.
NDI «eai

^ *rm*f>i thai all R\ 1 s associated nytih, hi a a.p1! iu iiejed Hie
modifications

clearly reflect, time and again, that the parties had not yet agreed on the terms of the final
transaction, and that FW'C desired to protect itself from being forced to turn over half of a
valuable asset on terms which might ultimately prove unfavorable.
Il II

The Doctrine Of Part Perfoi iiiaii.ee Is Inapplicable Here.

II is not clear that TGC properly preserved its "part, performance" argument
below. TGC made arguments about "reliance," and cited several cases, Some of those
cases, but not all,7 are "part, performance cases,"
In any event, the doctrine t»l paiI |>eih»m:ii t c ilc - ih»l ,i| ph hi flir1- i;j\» If
hMlr . i dui'trmr ol p.irl prilnmiancc by chilli in
narrow circumstances, courts may order specific peri-

e of some contracts which

w ould otherwise be barred by the Statute of Frauds. In every "part, performance" case

'
In its Memorandum,, in Opposition to i WC ^ Mouon to Dismiss (R.86),
'\ argues reliance," and cites, inter alia, Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 242 P,2d
: 78 11952). and English v. Standard Optical < - V* n ^ 613 (Utah App. 1991),
K ,;
': Tb kv v '* rirt perfornian.ee case,
22

cited here and below by GTC, the remedy was enforcement of the contract through
specific performance of the alleged oral modification.
However, this is not a specific performance case. TGC has neither
requested specific performance as a remedy, nor pled its prerequisites. Instead, TGC
seeks exorbitant damages for "profits" allegedly lost. Thus, the doctrine of part
performance does not apply to this case.
III.

THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
TGC argues that FWC violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing by exercising its discretionary right to reject the transaction when the Loan was
not received and the terms of the transaction became unattractive.
As an initial matter, FWC cannot be held to have breached any provision of
the Lol, because FWC was not bound by any of its terms until the Loan was funded and
received. Since that never happened - since the only performance allegedly tendered by
TGC did not include the Loan - there really was no need for FWC to exercise its
discretion.
But, even without the provision of the February 3, 1995 Modification,
which rendered the Lol non-binding until the Loan was received, FWC could not have
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by rejecting the transaction
offered by TGC.
23
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(i|ii<itifig /fr.Mni i ,\tm>n> *>7 ? P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998)). What TGC is asking the
Court to do - nx .AAw name of the implied covenant of good faith, and fair dealing - is to

read into the contract a right for TGC to make the unilateral determination to substitute a
cash payment for the Loan described in the Lol, and, in so doing, to bypass the process
set out in the Lol which gave FWC rights to negotiate and be satisfied with the terms of
the ultimate transaction and, absent such satisfaction, to walk away.
Put another way, TGC is not before the Court arguing that it fully
performed under the parties' contract but FWC exercised its discretion in bad faith to
withdraw, anyway. Rather, TGC is arguing that the Court should apply the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to alter the contract along the lines of the alleged
oral modifications which are barred by the Statute of Frauds.
TGC is arguing that the Court should imply a unilateral right for TGC to
alter the "linchpin" term of the contract because, in TGC's view, the substitute
performance was just as desirable as the performance called for by the contract.
In the process, TGC is asking the Court to bypass provisions giving FWC
the opportunity to negotiated the ultimate terms of the entire transaction, expressly
requiring FWC's consent to the terms of that transaction, and allowing FWC to reject the
transaction if it the business terms and conditions associated with the Loan - aside from
the terms of the Loan itself- were unsatisfactory to FWC.
This would amount to rewriting the contract. That is not the function of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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A CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT/QUASI-CONTRACT MAY
NOT BE MAINTAINED WHERE AN EXPRESS CONTRACT WAS
TERMINATED ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS.
If this case had gone to trial, FWC could have clearly demonstrated that the
documents prepared by I lit," in its pursuit of an ownership mlcrcsl in I A < s geolhei in.il

However, even accepting as true TGC's allegation that FWC was somehow
benefitted, there can be no claim for quantum meruit or quasi-contract in this case,
A claim for quasi-contract is oneform,,of action for quantum,, meruit.
i' "-ui ii • ! i V,M>// ' Iii 1* M .I'm
' I MVi (I I'Lili App I'M'" ) "T.n 01 rrv nndiT i|ii,'inlimi niri ill
presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." Id. at 268. I GC has
alleged the existence of a contract. That contract provided for the parties to bear their
own costs if the agreement became null, and, void (Material I erms *f 1(\ ii), R ,,1,6:19)
I V\ I (animated any allege: ., ,^aci pursuant Iii its cxptess Icinis

I lini'ton , lln In

I

could be stated (R 1,24)
TGC nor, argues that an exception to the foregoing i ule exists, and is set
forth, in Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzel, 876 P.2d 421 (I Jtah App. 1,994) I lowever,
iiaiL:}-Aiti?n creates no exception to the rule that, a claim for quantui n iiiei uit ma> not
I'MSI

alongside iiii express contrail

I o Ihr cnnlrw\ „ the ( ouil ol Appeals expressly held

that "there [was] no enforceable contract," before granting recovery in quantum meruit.
i.i ai 425 That was so because, in Bailey-Allen, the contract between, the parties had
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been breached by the party seeking recovery, and it was, therefore, unenforceable by that
party. Id. at 423-24, 425. Further, the Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he agreement is
silent regarding remedies in the event of a breach by either party." Id. at 423.
In this case, according to the Complaint, a contract existed. There was no
breach. The contract was terminated according to its terms. In addition, in this case, the
contract was not silent as to the effect of termination. It expressly stated that each party
would bear its own costs in the event the agreement was terminated. The district court
thus properly dismissed TGC's quantum meruit and quasi-contract claims.
CONCLUSION
The district court properly held that TGC's Complaint stated no claim. The
written contract alleged by TGC permitted FWC to terminate the relationship. No oral
modifications were permitted under the Statute of Frauds, and no theory of quantum
meruit applies to compensate TGC for documents it prepared for the failed relationship.
The decision of the district court should be affirmed.
DATED this M&day

of November, 2000.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Mary Anne Q. Wood
Kathryn Ogden Balmforth
Attorneys for Appellees
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